We study pseudorandom generator (PRG) 
Introduction
A rigorous notion of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) was introduced in the seminal works of Blum and Micali [7] and Yao [45] and have since found a striking variety of applications in Cryptography and Complexity Theory. A PRG G : {0, 1}
l → {0, 1} l+s is an efficient procedure that stretches l inputs bits into l + s output bits such that the output of the PRG is indistinguishable from random to efficient adversaries. That is, for every probabilistic polynomial time machine (PPT) A we have
Pr[A(G(U l )) = 1] − Pr[A(U l+s ) = 1] ≤
where U n denotes a uniform random variable in {0, 1} n and is negligible in l + s.
While the existence of PRGs is a major open problem, there has been a series of fascinating works constructing PRGs from weaker and weaker assumptions. Most of these works construct PRGs starting from one-way functions [7, 45, 31, 22, 21, 25] . Informally, a function is oneway if it is easy to compute but hard to invert on average. (The existence of one-way functions implies that P = NP , but the converse is not known to hold.) For a discussion of pseudorandom generators we refer to the reader to the excellent book by Goldreich [19] .
PRG constructions with polynomial stretch
A crucial parameter of every PRG G : {0,
l+s is its stretch s, that one wants as big as possible. Note that s is only relevant in relation with the input length l, since from a PRG G : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l+1 one can trivially construct, for every polynomial p, a PRG G : {0, 1} pl → {0, 1} pl+p with stretch p. G is the concatenation of the output of p copies of G on p independent
The main problem we study
The main question addressed in this paper is the following: Are PRG constructions with arbitrary stretch inherently sequential? This problem is motivated by the question, both practical and philosophical, of how much cryptography can be done in low complexity classes.
Of course, we must be more precise about what we mean by 'PRG construction' and 'sequential'.
We now discuss PRG constructions. We consider blackbox PRG constructions, as in many other works starting with the seminal paper by Impagliazzo and Rudich [29] . Roughly speaking, G f : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l+s is a blackbox PRG construction from one-way function f if there is a fixed PPT M such that, for every (computationally unbounded) oracle function f and adversary A, if A breaks the PRG then M inverts f . I.e., if A distinguishes the output of PRG from truly random, then M , when given oracle access to both f and A, can find a preimage of f (U n ) with noticeable probability. The idea is that if f (U n ) cannot be inverted with noticeable probability by a PPT (i.e., if f is one-way) then no PPT can break G f , and so G f is a PRG. Most results in Cryptography, and in particular most PRG constructions (for example [7, 45, 31, 22, 21, 25] ) are proved via black-box constructions.
We now define parallel PRG constructions. The notion of a parallel PRG construction we look at in this paper is the following, where l = l(n), m = m(n) and s = s(n):
l+s from oneway function f : {0,
where C x : {0, 1} poly(n) → {0, 1} l+s is a constant depth circuit of size poly(n), and C x , q x,1 , . . . , q x,poly(n) are generated from x arbitrarily. Table 1 : Parallel PRG construction.
By a constant depth circuit we mean AC 0 , i.e. a constant depth circuit with OR,AND gates, where AND, OR gates have unbounded fan-in (see e.g., [24] ).
PRG constructions in the form in Table 1 are intuitively parallel in the following sense: (1) The queries made to f are non-adaptive (i.e. they do not depend on f but only on x), and (2) C x is a constant depth circuit. It seems interesting to study black-box PRG constructions relaxing either (1) or (2), but we can prove our main negative results only when both apply.
Finally, note we do not make any assumption on how C x , q x,1 , . . . , q x,poly(n) are generated from x: This makes our negative result stronger, while in our positive results all the computation is done by a constant depth circuit.
Our Results on PRG Constructions
Next we discuss our results for PRG constructions. We have both positive and negative results. We start with the latter. 
Theorem 1.1 (This Paper
shows that black-box PRG constructions from one-way functions can only be parallel (i.e., in the form in Table 1 ) if s = o(l). And Theorem 1.1-(2) shows this holds even if the PRG construction starts with one-to-one functions, as long as the range of the one-to-one one-way function is sufficiently bigger than its domain.
In this work we also sketch a proof of the fact that (essentially) Theorem 1.1-(1) holds even for a less restrictive kind of black-box constructions, i.e. mildly black-box constructions.
It seems natural at this point to ask: is there any PRG construction in the form in Table 1 , even with stretch s = 1? The problems we must solve (to answer this question) depend on what kind of one-way function the PRG construction starts from. We now explain these problems and our contributions.
From (generic) one-way function: The only PRG construction that works in this case is [25] . This construction, even to produce a PRG with stretch s = 1, uses as a component the Goldreich-Micali Construction (1) discussed earlier in Section 1.1. As already noted, Construction (1) is not parallel. In this case we do not know if there is any parallel PRG construction.
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From one-to-one one-way function: The main problem here is that existing PRG constructions (e.g. [25] ) apply randomness extractors [39] to the evaluations of the oneway function. While it is known that constant-depth circuits cannot compute extractors with good parameters [34, 44] , in this work we show that constant-depth circuits can compute extractors for the setting of parameters that arises in some of these PRG constructions. Using this fact we obtain a parallel PRG construction (with some stretch s ≥ 1). We actually show parallel PRG constructions starting from the more general class of regular one-way functions, where a function f is regular if the number of preimages of f (x) depends on |x| but not on x.
From one-way permutation π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n : In this case we can use the PRG construction GL π : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n+1 by Goldreich and Levin and defined as GL π (y, r) := (π(y), r, y, r ), where y, r is a general hard-core predicate (see [22, 19] ). This is of the form in Table 1 , because for every input x = (y, r) the circuit C x that has y, r and r hardwired and is defined as C x (π(y)) := (π(y), r, y, r ) is trivially constant depth. But what happens if we require that all the computation be done in constant depth? We cannot use directly the above construction since it requires computing a general hard-core predicate (i.e, y, r ), which cannot be done in constant depth [18] . We bypass this problem by showing that it is sufficient to compute the output distribution of a general 1 However, Construction (1) can be dispensed with if one allows for O(log n) bits of nonuniformity in the PRG construction. One can then obtain a parallel PRG construction with our techniques. Details omitted.
hard-core predicate over a random input, and this in fact can be done by a constant-depth circuit.
We now state our positive results for PRG constructions. 
Theorem 1.2 (This Paper

Related Work
A concurrent and beautiful work related to ours is the one by Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz [4] . They show that the existence of a 'moderately easy' PRG, say in NC 1 (i.e. computable by circuits of polynomial-size and logarithmicdepth), implies the existence of a PRG in NC 0 (i.e. computable by circuits of polynomial-size and constant-depth with bounded fan-in). Note that in this work we consider the strictly larger class AC 0 (the class of functions computable by circuits of polynomial-size and constant depth with unbounded fan-in.) However, the NC 0 PRG of [4] has sublinear stretch even if the original NC 1 PRG has polynomial stretch. This is interesting in relation with our negative results that only rule out parallel black-box PRG constructions with linear stretch. (They also prove analogous connections for other cryptographic primitives, such as one-way functions.) Moreover, they improve on our Theorem 1.2 obtaining the same results for constant-depth circuits with bounded fan-in (whereas our Theorem 1.2 refers to constant-depth circuits with unbounded fan-in, specifically our result uses fan-in log 1+ n). (This result of theirs uses techniques similar to ours.) Another beautiful work related to ours is the one by Gennaro and Trevisan [17] . They show that there is no blackbox PRG construction G π : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l+s that makes less than s/ω(log n) queries to π. This holds even if G f is a PRG construction from one-way permutations. The work of Gennaro and Trevisan is thus a tradeoff between the stretch of the PRG construction and the number of queries it makes to f . The difference with our work is the following: We are not concerned with how many queries G f makes to f , rather we are concerned with how these queries are made and processed. Note that our bounds in Theorem 1.1 essentially do not depend on the number of queries made to f (except for the hidden constant in the negligible factor log O(1) n). Rather, they depend on the parallel structure of G.
There exist several other works addressing the complexity of PRGs. Kharitonov, Goldberg and Yung [30] and Yu and Yung [46] prove strong negative results about the ability of various automata and other space-restricted devices to compute PRGs. Linial, Mansour and Nisan [32] prove that constant depth circuits cannot compute pseudorandom functions (an object related to PRGs). Impagliazzo and Naor [28] show how to construct PRGs based on the assumed intractability of the subset sum problem. In particular, they show how to construct a PRG :
n+log n computable by constant depth circuits. Reif and Tygar [40] and Naor and Reingold [36] construct PRGs under specific number-theoretic complexity assumptions.
In [44] the author studies the complexity of a different kind of PRG constructions, namely those based on the Nisan-Wigderson paradigm [38] . The results in [44] do not seem to be comparable to the ones in this paper, as they apply to this different kind of PRG constructions. However, both works use results on the noise sensitivity of constantdepth circuits in the proof of their negative results.
Worst-case Hardness Amplification
Another problem we study in this paper is the problem of worst-case hardness amplification, which is the problem of producing an average-case hard function starting from a worst-case hard function. A motivation for studying this problem is to establish connections between average-case complexity and worst-case complexity, as it has been accomplished for high complexity classes such PSPACE and EXP (e.g. [33, 6, 5, 14, 11, 42, 43, 44] ). Most constructions in these works are black-box both in the use of the worst-case hard function f and in the 'proof of correctness'. Namely they exhibit efficient algorithms Amp and R such that for every function f and every adversary A, if A computes Amp f well on average then R A computes f everywhere. Note that if f is worst-case hard then R A cannot be a small circuit. Since R is efficient this means that A cannot be a small circuit, and hence Amp f is average-case hard. There are results showing that such connections (i.e., between worst-case and average-case hardness) for classes within the polynomial-time hierarchy (PH ) are unlikely to be provable using these kind of black-box techniques: Bogdanov and Trevisan [8] , building on [15] , show that every hardness amplification within NP such that its proof of correctness is black-box and R is non-adaptive implies that the P H collapses, and therefore such a hardness amplification is unlikely to exist. In a previous work [44] we showed (unconditionally) that there is no hardness amplification within P H where both the use of f and the proof of correctness are black-box.
In this paper we obtain the first negative result on hardness amplifications within P H that are black-box only in the use of f . Specifically, we show that exhibiting such hardness amplification procedures is equivalent to exhibiting an average-case hard function in P H, in which case no hardness amplification is needed. We give one necessary definition and then our result.
Definition 1.3. A function f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} is worstcase-hard (resp., -hard) for size S if every circuit of size S fails to compute f on some input (resp., on at least fraction of inputs).
Theorem 1.4 (This Paper). Let S(n) be such that for every c and sufficiently large n, S(n) ≤ 2
n /n c . Suppose there is a constant a and an oracle machine Amp in P H such that for every f : {0,
size S (n).
Techniques
We now sketch the main ideas in the proof of Theorem 1.1-(1). Similarly to other works [29, 17] , the idea is to choose the oracle function f at random from a certain distributionF , then show that (1)F is one-way w.h.p. but also (2) there is an adversary that breaks GF w.h.p., thus contradicting the fact that G is a black-box PRG construction. The main new ingredient in this work is that some of the bits in the truth-table ofF are fixed, and we will give them for free to the adversary. We will then show that for this fixing of bits GF is easy to break. One of the challenges is of course showing thatF is still one-way after these bits have been fixed. More specifically, the bits to be fixed are chosen by applying a random restriction [16] to the truth table of the oracle f . Since G f (x) is a constant depth function of evaluations of f , and because after applying a random restriction to a constant depth circuit the circuit 'tremendously simplifies' (see e.g. [16, 24] ), it is possible to exhibit an adversary that breaks the output of G. More specifically, we will use the fact that constant depth circuits have low noise sensitivity [32, 9, 44] , which means that after fixing most of its input bits, a constant depth circuit becomes very biased, i.e. its output does not change much when the few unfixed input bits are filled at random.
For Theorem 1.1- (2) we define a particular distribution on restrictions that also ensures that the oracle f is one-toone.
We now sketch the main ideas of our negative result about Hardness Amplification, Theorem 1.4. As before, we will choose the oracle function f at random from a certain distributionF where some of the bits are fixed in such a way that, (1)F is still worst-case hard w.h.p., but (2) AmpF is trivialized. Again, the bits to be fixed are chosen applying a random restriction to the truth table of the oracle f . The idea now is that since AmpF is trivialized, we can dispense with the oracle and construct an average-case hard function h from scratch, thus proving the theorem. But the problem is that we don't know what is the fixing of the bits that satisfies (1) and (2). An idea would be to include the fixing of the bits in the input to the function h, but the problem is that the size of this fixing of bits is of the order of the truth table of the oracle f , i.e. 2 n , while we need the input length of h to be polynomial in n (since the circuit size S in Theorem 1.4 is relative to the input length of f ). To overcome this problem, we derandomize the random restriction. I.e., we create a pseudorandom distribution on restrictions that can be generated using only poly(n) random bits, yet still w.h.p. satisfies (1) and (2). Now, the function h takes σ as part of the input, where σ is of size poly(n) and is used to generate a pseudorandom restriction. Now the input length of h is polynomial in n and the theorem can be proved. This pseudorandom distribution on restrictions is obtained using Nisan's unconditional PRG against constant depth circuits [37] . The challenges of course are showing that after this derandomization (1) and (2) still hold. In particular, for (2) we show that a constant depth circuit becomes very biased even after applying a pseudorandom restriction. The idea of using Nisan's generator to derandomize restrictions already appeared in [12] .
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss notation. In Section 3 we prove our negative result for black-box PRG constructions in the form in Table 1 from one-way function, i.e. we prove Theorem 1.1-(1). The analogous result for one-to-one one-way functions is proved in Section 6. In Appendix B we sketch a proof of the fact that (essentially) Theorem 1.1-(1) also holds for "mildly black-box" PRG constructions. (Due to space restrictions this sketch is very rough.) In Section 4 we prove our positive result about PRG constructions in constant-depth circuits from one-way permutations, i.e. we prove Theorem 1.2-(1). We omit the details of the proof of the analogous result for regular one-way function, i.e. Theorem 1.2- (2) (but the key idea is discussed at the end of Section 4). Our negative result for hardness amplification, i.e. Theorem 1.4, is proved in Section 5. We discuss some open problems in Section 7. Appendix A contains some proof details.
Preliminaries
We denote by U n the uniform random variable over {0, 1} n and by F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m a uniform random function. ∆(x, y) is the relative Hamming distance between vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , i.e. Pr i [x i = y i ]. Due to space restrictions, we sometimes write ∆(x, y) as ∆ x y . Throughout the paper (n) denotes a quantity negligible in n, i.e. 1/n ω (1) . We write 'w.h.p.' for 'with high probability', i.e. with probability 1 − o(1).
Restrictions: A restriction ρ on t bits is an element of {0, 1, * } t , where we think of the *'s as values yet to be chosen. For x ∈ {0, 1} t we denote by x ρ ∈ {0, 1} t the string obtained from ρ by substituting the *'s with the corresponding bits of x. Note x ρ only depends on the bits of x corresponding to * in ρ. We often consider restrictions on b · m bits, where b can be as large as 2 n , and it will be convenient to view such restrictions as functions ρ :
The following is a key definition: for a function f : {0,
For a fixed restriction ρ, a key random variable we will look at is
m is a uniform random function). Note that F ρ can be seen as the distribution on functions whose truth table is obtained starting from the truth table of ρ and replacing each * with a uniform and independent random bit. The standard [16] distribution on restrictions R δ is the one where each symbol in the restriction is independently * with probability δ and otherwise it is a uniform and independent random bit. When we say that ρ : [b] → {0, 1, * } m is random in R δ we mean that each of the b · m symbols in the truth table of ρ is independently * with probability δ and otherwise it is a uniform and independent random bit.
We would like to point out some differences between our notation for restrictions (above) and the notation more commonly used in literature (e.g. [16, 24] ). The notation commonly used in literature is the following: for a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m and a restriction ρ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {0, 1, * } with s stars (i.e. exactly s distinct indexes i such that ρ(i) = * ) one denotes by f | ρ : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} m the function obtained by 'restricting' f on the s bits mapped to * by ρ, where the other bits are fixed as prescribed by ρ.
s is the projections of x on the s bits mapped to * by ρ. Our notation is more convenient in our setting where the restriction applied to f depends on the input x. To avoid confusion we will never use the notation f | ρ in the rest of the paper.
Black-box PRG constructions:
Now we formally define black-box PRG constructions. 
We say G is from one-to-one one-way function (resp., from regular one-way function) if the above is only required to hold when f is one-to-one (resp., regular).
We think of l, s, m as functions of n. Recall a function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} is regular if the number of preimages of f (x) depends on |x| but not on x. The values 1/4 and 1/n in Definition 2.1 can be substituted by 1/p(n) for any polynomial p(n). We fix them for concreteness. In Definition 2.1, and throughout the paper, probabilities are (implicitly) taken also over the internal coin tosses of the PPTs. For more on black-box constructions we refer the reader to the survey in the paper by Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan [41] (in their taxonomy, Definition 2.1 defines a 'fully black-box' PRG construction).
Proof of Theorem 1.1-(1)
In this section we prove our negative result about blackbox PRG constructions that start from (generic) one-way function, i.e Theorem 1.1-(1). We now proceed to sketch the main ideas in the proof. Suppose
l+s is a PRG construction from one-way function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , and let M be the inverting machine required by Definition 2.1. The high level idea is to come up with, for sufficiently large n, a function f : 
II. There is a fixed function g : {0,
(Where E denotes expectation and recall that ∆ denotes relative Hamming distance.)
Intuitively, (I) says that F ρ is hard to invert just because of the randomness left in F even after fixing some of the bits in its truth table according to ρ.
is close in Hamming distance to a vector that does not depend on the oracle. Before discussing how to construct the restriction ρ, let us show how to prove the theorem once we have such a ρ.
Proof of Theorem 1.1-(1), assuming ρ satisfies (I) and (II).
Let g be the function given by Property (II), and let d be a sufficiently large constant. Consider the following (computationally unbounded) adversary
The proof of the theorem follows from Claim 3.1 as follows: By the claim, w.h.p. over F , A g breaks G Proof of Claim 3.1. By Property (II) and Markov's inequality, w.h.p. over F , we have
On the other hand, we also have:
where for every x we bound
where (1 − p) ) is the binary entropy function (see any book on Coding Theory).
Since
To conclude, recall from the statement of Theorem 1.1- (1) that m = log ω(1) n.
Constructing ρ
We now turn to the problem of constructing ρ that satisfies Properties (I) and (II). Again, our construction of ρ will be probabilistic. That is, we will show a distribution on restrictions that satisfies both Properties (I) and (II) w.h.p.. This certainly guarantees the existence of one fixed ρ that satisfies both Properties (I) and (II). We start with some intuition and then we give the actual construction.
Noise Sensitivity of Constant Depth Circuits: For property (II) we use the low noise sensitivity of constant depth circuits. Recall from Section 2 that the standard distribution on restrictions R δ is the distribution on restrictions where each symbol is independently * with probability δ and otherwise it is a uniform independent random bit. 
For completeness, we show in Appendix A a simple derivation of Lemma 3.2 from known results [44] . Then, assuming G makes r queries to f , we have the following, taking expectations over random choice of uniform random functions F, F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , random input
x ∈ {0, 1} n and random ρ ∈ R δ . (Due to space restrictions, we also write the Hamming distance between two strings z and w, ∆(z, w), as ∆ z w .)
Where Equation (2) follows from the definition of ρ and F ρ , assuming without loss of generality that G F ρ (x) never queries the same input twice. So by fixing F = g and then applying Markov's inequality, we have that most ρ satisfy Property (II) with the expectation at most O(δ log d−1 S), which is at most (poly log n)/m, as required by Property (II), when δ ≤ (poly log n)/m (recall the size of C x is S = poly n). The conclusion is that for property (II) the standard distribution R δ suffices when δ ≤ (poly log n)/m. F ρ one-way: Recall for Property (I) we want F ρ to still be one-way after we fix ρ, even relative to an oracle that depends on ρ (i.e. A). The main problem here is that the restriction could conceivably leak information about the input. For example, if m = 2n, i.e. the range of F is {0, 1} 2n , then one could consider the pathological restriction ρ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1, * } 2n such that for every x the first n symbols of ρ(x) are x. Now the inversion of F ρ (x) is trivial, because the output completely reveals the input. A similar problem arises w.h.p. when ρ is selected according to the distribution R δ for m sufficiently large. (In fact, we take advantage of this in Section 6.) To overcome this problem we need another idea. The idea is to ensure that for most x there is a superpolynomial number of y's such that ρ(x) = ρ(y). This implies that after we are given F ρ (U n ) we have little information about U n , since information-theoretically U n is uniform on a set of superpolynomial size. To achieve this we compose a random restriction ρ : (1) . We now give the formal definition of this distribution and then show that it satisfies properties (I) and (II) w.h.p..
Definition 3.3. The distributionR on restrictions ρ
We now show that w.h.p. ρ 0 • h satisfies both Properties (I) and (II). Thus Theorem 1.1-(1) follows from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 3.4. A random ρ = ρ 0 • h ∈R satisfies Property (I) w.h.p.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that (ρ 0 • h)(y) contains at least log 2 n *'s for every y. This is because the probability that this does not happen is at most, using union bounds (recall δ = log 4 n/m, m = log ω(1) n, m = n O (1) , and b = n log n ):
≤ (n).
Now we fix any such ρ 0
• h and we analyze the inversion probability over random F and random input X ≡ U n . By the pigeon hole principle, there are at most b2 n/2 inputs x such that there are fewer than 2 n/2 y's such that
there is only an exponentially small fraction of such x's. So let us assume without loss of generality that X is such that there are at least 2 n/2 y's such that h(X) = h(y). In the following we restrict our attention to the queries M makes to the oracle function F ρ0•h , and we make no assumption on the queries it makes to the adversary A. First, without loss of generality assume that M queries its output (clearly it does not hurt for M to check its answer before outputting it) and that M never queries any input twice (this can be accomplished by keeping a simple list of the inputs queried and of the oracle answers).
Since M queries its output, the probability (over F, X) that M inverts F ρ0•h (X) is the probability that (1) M queries X or (2) M queries y = X such that F ρ0•h (y) = F ρ0•h (X). We bound these two events separately.
(1): By our assumption, there are at least 2 n/2 y's such that h(X) = h(y). Therefore, given F ρ0•h (X), X is uniform on a set of inputs of size at least 2 n/2 . Hence the probability that M queries X is negligible because M only makes poly(n) queries.
A more formal argument goes as follows: Suppose M queries X with nonnegligible probability. We construct another (computationally unbounded, depending on h and ρ 0 ) machine M without oracle access to F ρ0•h that outputs a polynomial size list containing X with nonnegligible probability. But this is impossible because, as we said before, given F ρ0•h (X), X is uniform on a set of inputs of size at least 2 n/2 . M simply simulates M and whenever M queries F ρ0•h at q, it adds q to the list and answers the query with U m ρ0•h(q) where U m is uniform and independent from all the previous query answers. It is easy to see that the probability that M queries X is the same as the probability that X is in the list that M outputs.
(2): On the other hand, whenever M queries y = X then by definition
, where U m is uniform and independent from X and the state of M , since M never queries the same input twice. Since by our assumption ρ 0 • h(y) has at least log 2 n *'s, it follows that with probability at most 1/n log n we have F ρ0•h (y) = F ρ0•h (X). Again, since M only makes poly(n) queries, the probability that M ever queries y = X such that
Therefore, the total probability that M inverts F ρ0•h (X) is negligible. Proof. In order to show Property (II) all we need is Equation (2) in Page 7 to go through approximately. Let F, F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be random uniform random functions, x ∈ {0, 1} n a random input, ρ 0 • h a random restriction iñ R and ρ a random restriction in R δ for δ := log 4 n/m (i.e.
the same δ in Definition 3.3.) Consider the random variable (due to space restrictions, we also write the Hamming distance between two strings z and w,
We show
Note Lemma 3.5 follows from Inequality 3 as explained before in Page 7: we use Lemma 3.2 to bound
by O(δ poly log n), then we fix F = g and use Markov's inequality. So all we need to show is that Inequality 3 holds:
Where we use the fact that conditioned on the event "h(q i ) = h(q j ) for every i = j" the induced distribution of ρ 0 • h is exactly R δ . And then we use the fact that a random function mapping in [b] has collision probability 1/b, i.e., for every a = b we have
Since G makes only r queries to f , the probability that there are i = j, such that h(q i ) = h(q j ) is at most r 2 /b. Noticing that r 2 /b is negligible because b = n log n and r = poly(n) concludes the proof.
PRG constructions in constant depth circuits
In this section we show our PRG construction in constant-depth circuits from one-way permutations, i.e., we prove the following theorem which is a restatement of Theorem 1.2-(1).
Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 1.2-(1)). If there is a one-way permutation f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n in constant depth circuits then there is PRG G : {0, 1}
2n → {0, 1} 2n+1 in constant depth circuits.
We use the same pseudorandom distribution of Goldreich and Levin [22] , and our only difficulty is showing how it can be generated in constant depth circuits. We denote by x, y the Goldreich-Levin general hard-core predicate [22] , i.e. i x i y i (mod 2).
Theorem 4.2 ([22]). Let f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n be a one-
At first glance GL f does not seem to be computable in constant depth circuits, because parity is not [16, 24] . In the following lemma we show how to circumvent this problem. C(x, y) ).
Lemma 4.3. There is a constant depth circuit
C : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n+1 such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n , C(x, U n ) is distributed as (U n , x, U n ).
Theorem 4.1 follows from Lemma 4.3 simply defining
The key observation to prove Lemma 4.3 is that while constant depth circuits cannot compute the parity function, constant depth circuits can generate a random x together with its parity. To see this, consider the constant depth circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+1 such that C(r 1 , . . . , r n ) := (r 1 , r 2 ⊕ r 1 , r 3 ⊕ r 2 , . . . , r n ⊕ r n−1 , r n ). It is easy to see that C(U n ) outputs a random value in {0, 1} n and its parity, and moreover C is constant depth. This observation is from [10] .
To prove Lemma 4.3 we use the same approach, but only on the bits of x that are 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 . Let the input be x = x 1 , . . . , x n and r = r 1 , . . . , r n , and consider the circuit C : {0,
n+1 , C(x, r) = r b, where r = r 1 , . . . , r n and b ∈ {0, 1}, defined as follows: 
It is not too hard to see that
It is also easy to check that C can be implemented in constant depth. (Indeed, this follows from the fact that we defined it using first-order logic.)
For constructions from one-to-one and regular one-way functions the only additional thing we need are extractors. While constant-depth circuits cannot in general compute extractors with good parameters [44] , it can be shown that they can compute extractors (specifically, one based on the hash function due to Carter and Wegman [13] ) for the parameters of interest here (i.e. seed length polynomial in the source length) (details omitted).
Worst-case Hardness Amplification
In this section we prove Theorem 1.4. Let us first recall the definition of a hard function.
Definition 5.1. A function f : {0, 1}
Before proving Theorem 1.4 we make some remarks.
Remarks on Theorem 1.4: (1) We focus on amplification up to constant (i.e. .3). Notice that by Yao's XOR lemma (cf. [23] ) if P H has a 1/ poly(n)-hard function for size S (n) then P H has a .3-hard function for size poly S (n Ω (1)) . (2) We required (in the statement of the theorem) that for every c and for sufficiently large n, S(n) ≤ 2 n /n c . This is because for S ≥ 2 n /n c for some fixed constant c, the oracle is already 1/ poly(n)-hard by a counting argument (given in [44] ), and therefore by the previous item P H has a .3-hard function.
(3) Similar results hold for hardness amplifications Amp f : {0, 1} l(n) → {0, 1} running in time t(n) with a constant number of alternations, for a wide range of parameters l(n), t(n). Here we set l(n) = poly(n) and t(n) = poly(n) for simplicity of exposition.
In this section functions are boolean. In particular F will denote a uniform random function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Accordingly, we take restrictions ρ on 2 n bits, ρ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, which we see as a partial assignment to the truth table of f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}.
To prove Theorem 1.4 we build a certain pseudorandom distribution on restrictions. This is the main technical lemma of this section. 
(Where the Bias of a 0
We now assume the above Lemma and prove Theorem 1.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. By standard techniques (see e.g., [16, 24] ), the oracle algorithm in PH can be turned into an exponential size constant-depth circuit whose input is the truth table of the oracle f . In particular, let c be such that Amp f (x) has depth c and size 2 n c when turned into a constant depth circuit whose only input is the truth 
Thus there is a function η(n) = o(1) such that
Where ∆(f, f ) denotes the relative Hamming distance of the truth tables of f, f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Thus: (1)) > .1 fraction of inputs, and thus A is .1-hard for size S (n).
To finish the proof note that A is in PH and that it has input length n b for some b.
We now discuss Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 . This is a simple counting argument. 
Lemma 5.4 was essentially proved by Nisan in [37] (see also [38] ) (In [37, 38] the lemma is stated as "almost-P H=P H"). We omit the details here. (Note Lemma 5.4 does not immediately follow from the more well-known fact that BPP ⊆ PH (even though the latter result is used in Nisan's proof). This is because in 5.4 the machine Amp has access (through the oracle) to an exponential (as opposed to polynomial) number of random bits.)
Pseudorandom restrictions
In this section we prove Lemma 5.2. A key tool is Nisan's pseudorandom generator against constant depth circuits.
Theorem 5.5 ([37]). For every constant c and every n there is a generator Nis : {0, 1}
poly log n → {0, 1} n such that (1) given x and i ≤ n we can compute the i-th bit of Nis (x) in time poly log(n) and (2) N is 1/n-pseudorandom for circuits of size n and depth c. That is, for every circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} of size n and depth c: 
The above equation in turn implies that w.p.
. Moreover by a Chernoff bound the fraction of * 's in ρ ∈ R δ will be concentrated around δ.
So R δ satisfies Items (2) and (3) in Lemma 5.2. But the problem is that R δ requires at least 2 n bits to be generated, while we aim to a distribution on restrictions which can be generated with poly n bits. To this aim we derandomize R δ .
Let W be a canonical circuit that given I := O(2 n log(1/δ)) random bits generates R δ (say we use blocks of O(log(1/δ)) bits to put a * with probability δ). It is easy to see that there is such a circuit W of size poly(2 n ) and depth O (1) .
We now defineR c . Consider Nis : {0, 1} We now prove thatR c has the required properties. (1) By constructionR c can be generated with poly(n) random bits. As shown in [37] , given i and the random bits σ we can compute the i-th symbol of ρ σ ∈R c in polynomial time.
(2) Let t := 2 n . First we show that, even under such restrictions, circuits of size 2 n c and depth c still have low noise sensitivity, the claim about the bias then easily follows. To show this we use an approach similar to one used in [26] . As noticed there, the noise sensitivity of a constant depth circuit C equals the acceptance probability of another (slightly bigger) constant depth circuit C defined as follows: Given a restriction ρ, C tosses coins for U t and U t and answers 1 if and only if C(U t ρ ) = C(U t ρ ). It is easy to see that such a C can be implemented in constant depth. Combining C with our constant depth circuit W that given random bits generates a random restriction in R δ we obtain another constant depth circuit C := C • W . Now, the acceptance probability of C over a truly random input is the noise sensitivity of C with respect to R δ , while the acceptance probability of C over a pseudorandom input generated using Nisan's PRG Nis is the noise sensitivity of C with respect toR c . Therefore, since C cannot distinguish the output of Nisan's PRG from truly random, we deduce that the noise sensitivity of C with respect toR c is close to the noise sensitivity of C with respect to R δ .
Therefore, choosing a sufficiently large constant c in the definition ofR c we have that, for every C : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} of size 2 n c and depth c:
(by Equation (6))
We now deduce a claim about the bias. By above there is a function η(n) = o(1) such that If the bit string has fewer than u − 2 n /n i occurrences of '1' then C outputs 0.
Noticing that Pr
We expect a random ρ ∈ R δ to have δ2 n * 's. By a concentration bound the probability that it has less than (δ2 n )/2 is o(1). Since δ = 1/n c 2 = 1/ poly(n), by Lemma 5.6 there is a constant depth circuit of size poly(2 n ) that can distinguish the cases, say, "more than δ/2 fraction of * 's" and "less than δ/3 fraction of * 's" (setting u := (δ2 n )/2.5 in Lemma 5.6). Therefore, choosing a sufficiently large constant c in the definition ofR c , by pseudorandomness, we have that ρ σ ∈R c has at least (δ2 n )/3 * 's w.h.p..
PRG constructions from one-to-one one-way functions
In this section we prove our negative result for blackbox parallel PRG constructions from one-to-one one-way functions, i.e. the proof of Theorem 1.1-(2).
The problem is that the functions F ρ0•h defined in Section 3 are not one-to-one. To ensure this property, we define another distribution on restrictions and from this a new distribution on one-to-one functions. This definition is slightly elaborate because injectivity is in tension with the fact that we need ρ(x) to not uniquely identify x (to preserve the one-wayness of the oracle, see Section 3).
We denote by ρ(x) k ∈ {0, 1, * } the k-th symbol of ρ(x). We say that a restriction ρ : 
cn we denote a random one-to-one function F consistent with ρ 0 • h, i.e. such that It is easy to check that the space of restrictions R is not empty, i.e. there exist restrictions that satisfy Definition 6.1. It is also easy to see that this guarantees that the space of functions F ρ0•h is not empty, because in Definition 6.1 ρ splits and, for every i ≤ b, ρ(i) has at least log 2 n *'s and finally there are only n log n inputs mapping to the same i through h.
All that is left to do is to show that ρ 0 • h satisfies Properties (I) and (II) from Page 6 w.h.p.. Of course, these properties must now be satisfied for our new space of random functions, namely F ρ0•h . Since this slightly changes the properties, we now repeat them.
i. For every oracle A, with high probability over
Pr
ii. There is a fixed function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} c·n such that (due to space restrictions, we also write the Hamming distance between two strings z and w, ∆(z, w),
Note Property (i) is simpler than Property (I) on Page 6
because now F ρ0•h is always one-to-one. Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4. Let X ≡ U n be a random input. As in Lemma 3.4 assume that M queries its output and that never queries the same input twice. Given F ρ0•h (X), by construction X is uniform over a set superpolynomial size. Since M only makes poly(n) query, M queries X with negligible probability. A more formal argument goes as follows: Suppose M queries X with nonnegligible probability. We construct another (computationally unbounded, depending on h and ρ 0 ) machine M without oracle access to F ρ0•h that outputs a polynomial size list containing X with nonnegligible probability. But this is impossible because, as we said before,
given all the previous query answers and from F ρ0•h (X) (this is always possible since M only makes poly(n) queries and ρ 0 (i) contains at least log 2 n *'s for every i). It is easy to see that the probability that M queries X is the same as the probability that X is in the list that M outputs. Consider the random variable (due to space restrictions, we also write the Hamming distance between two strings z and w, ∆(z, w), as ∆ As in Lemma 3.5, Lemma 6.3 follows from the following inequality:
To prove Inequality 7, notice that E[V ] is at most 
Above, the second inequality follows from the fact that b = n ω(1) (this is not too hard to check). In the next equality we use the fact that the distribution m is a truly random restriction). The inequality follows from the fact that, with high probability, the distribution of any r = poly(n) fixed values of ρ 0 looks like the distribution of the corresponding values of ρ . To show this latter claim we need to bound two probabilities.
First, the probability that ρ ∈ R δ does not split can be bound as follows. Fix i = j. The probability that does not exist k > log 2 n such that ρ (i) k = 1 and ρ (i) k = 0, or ρ (i) k = 0 and ρ (i) k = 1 is at most (δ + δ + 1/2) cn−log
